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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
This case involves the liability of an individual Guarantor 
under the specific provisions of a Guaranty Agreement entered 
between the Respondent, C. A. Bailey and the Appellant, Spanish 
Trail. The issues to be determined are as follows: 
I. Does the failure of Spanish Trail to fulfill the 
conditions of paragraph 6 of the Guaranty Agreement act as a release 
of the Guarantor? 
II. Does a modification of the contract without the approval 
of the Guarantor operate to release the Guarantor from liability 
under the terms of the Guaranty Contract? 
III. Is the Guarantor estopped from claiming a release based 
upon substitution of collateral or modification of the contract? 
IV. Does the substitution of collateral without the approval 
of the Guarantor operate to release the Guarantor from liability 
under the terms of the Guaranty contract? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT 
This is a suit alleging breach of contract, promissory 
note and seeking to enforce the terms of a Guaranty. Judgment 
was entered in favor of Spanish Trail against Carrier Brokers 
for breach of contract and failure to pay a promissory note. 
Judgment was entered in favor of Spanish Trail against J. M. 
Stoof on his guaranty of the agreement between Spanish Trail 
and Carrier Brokers. Those portions of the Judgment are not being 
appealed. 
The lower Court found that the Guarantor, C.A. Bailey, was 
xeieasea from his Guaranty due to the substitution of collateral, 
of which he had no knowledge. The Court further found C.A. 
Bailey free of liability because paragraph 4 of the agreement 
did not pertain to the Guarantors but only to Carrier Brokers. 
Bailey was also held released from the Gujaranty due to Spanish Trail's 
failure to comply with the conditions of 
FACTS 
paragraph 6 of the agreement. 
not timely paid to 
rate of twenty-five 
anteed collection of 
On July 20, 1981 an agreement was entered into between 
Spanish Trail and Brokers. Pursuant to the terms of the agreement, 
Spanish Trail agreed to loan Carrier Brokers the sum of $200,000.00 
for the purchase of 60,000 cases of Coca-Cola. The agreement 
provided that Spanish Trail would be repaid $10,000.00 or twenty 
percent (20%) of the profits from the sale of the Coca-Cola, 
in addition to the $200,000.00 loan. Sums} 
Spanish Trail were to bear interest at the 
percent (25%) per annum. C. A. Bailey guar 
this agreement. 
The key provisions of this agreement, as they relate to 
this Appeal are paragraphs 4, 5 and 6. These paragraphs are set 
forth m their entirety as follows: 
4. INTEREST. Any and all funds due Spanish 
Trail under the terms of this agreement not timely 
paid shall bear interest at the ijate of twenty-five 
(25%) percent per annum until paid or collected. If 
the terms of this agreement are breached by Carrier, 
damages and any delinquency of principal shall bear 
interest at the rate of twenty-five (25%) percent 
per annum until principal and intlerest is fully 
paid and Carrier and/or Guarantor! hereby waives its 
rights of presentment,demand, protest, notice of 
dishonor and extension of time without notice and 
Carrier further consents to release of any security 
or collateral hereunder, or any p&rt thereof, with 
or without substitution. 
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5. PERSONAL GUARANTY. The signature of 
the Guarantors hereto obligates the named 
Guarantors jointly and severally to guarantee 
full and faithful performance on behalf of 
Carrier of all of theterms, conditions, covenants, 
and agreement herein contained. 
6. COLLATERAL. Carrier hereby acknow-
ledges and agrees that the Coca-Cola is here-
by pledged to Spanish Trail as collateral to 
secure this agreement. Spanish Trail hereby 
agrees that if it became necessary it would 
first pursue and exhaust its remedy for repay-
ment of any funds due it by taking the Coca-
Cola without Court Order and selling same in 
any reasonable commercial fashion. Carrier 
upon default or its breach of this agreement 
hereby agrees to immediately release and con-
vey without bond or Court Order to Spanish 
Trail the Coca-Cola. Secondly Carrier pledges 
as collateral its equity in its real estate by 
way of a second deed of trust in and thereto 
to Spanish Trail, and if necessary same will 
be applied towards fulfilling this agreement 
after Spanish Trail has exhausted its remedy 
of using its best efforts in selling the Coca-
Cola. Having exhausted the aforementioned 
remedies and if any delinquency still exists 
under the terms of this agreement then 
Spanish Trail can pursue said delinquency 
against the undersigned Guarantor and 
Carrier either jointly or severally. 
Unbeknownst to Bailey, the Agreement was subsequently modified 
to change the interest rate to five percent (5%) per month 
sixty percent (60%) per annum. This modification was negotiated 
between J. M. Stoof and Spanish Trail, through its agent, 
Roger Mattson. Also unbeknownst to Bailey, the agreed upon 
collateral, Coca-Cola, was substituted for ice cream and frozen 
fish. This was done with the approval of Spanish Trail [_ stoof 
Deposition at pages 7 and 14/, when informed by tne manager of 
Carrier, J. M. Stoof, that all of the Coca-Cola could not be 
obtained. It was at this same time that the interest rate was 
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modified. During the times in question C. A. Bailey was 
the President of Carrier Brokers. J. ML Stoof was the manager. 
Stoof ran Carrier Brokers and made all of the managerial 
decisions without authorization of the officers or Board 
of Directors. The testimony indicated the substitution and 
modification of the agreement without the knowledge or consent of 
Bailey. Bailey first learned of thechar^ ges after the fact, 
when the agreement was in default. 
Bailey made it clear that Spanish trjail must proceed 
against the collateral before proceeding on the Guaranty 
/"~ Bailey Deposition at page 10_/. Spanish Trail conceded 
that it never took possession of any Coca-Cola or other 
inventory. Two trustee sales of Carrier( 
were called off by Spanish Trail /_ Stoof 
fs real property 
Deposition at page 12/ 
A third was delayed ninety (90) days by stipulation of Spanish 
Trail and Carrier Brokers. The property 
closed by Valley Bank. 
was ultimately fore-
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Spanish Trail has failed to meet the conditions of paragraph 
6 of the Guaranty Agreement. This failure releases the Guarantor, 
Bailey,from liability to the Guaranty, as compliance with the 
terms is a condition precedent to proceeding against the Guarantor. 
Spanish Trail andJ. M. Stoof have negotiated a substantial 
modification of the agreement, thus releasing Bailey from his 
personal Guaranty. 
Bailey cannot be estopped from asserting his release of liability 
for the reason that he had no knowledge of the changes to the agreement. 
He was therefore unable to make any representations or do any acts 
which would induce Spanish Trail to change their position. The 
conditional Guaranty at issue in this case contemplates a one time 
transaction with a readily marketable commodity pledged as security. 
The subscription of that commodity, for less marketable commodities 
acts to release Bailey from his Guaranty, as the Guaranty contemplates 




THE FAILURE OF SPANISH TRAIL TO PROCEED AGAINST 
THE COLLATERAL RELEASES BAILEY AS A GUARANTOR 
The Guaranty in the present case is a conditional Guaranty in 
that certain conditions must be met Defore the Guaranty is operable. 
The intention of the parties, as set forth in paragraph 6 was clearly 
that Spanish Trail must proceed against the Coca-Cola and real 
property prior to proceeding against Bailey. The Utah Supreme Court 
in Wall vs. Eccles 51 Utah 247, 211 P. 702 (1922) defined both an 
absolute Guaranty and a Conditional Guaranty. The Court defined a 
Conditional Guaranty as follows: 
Where the Guaranty is not Enforceable 
immediately upon the default of the! principal 
debtor but the Guarantor is obliged "to take 
some steps to fix liability upon th|e Guaranty, 
sucn as diligently prosecuting the blaim 
against the principal debtor, the Guaranty is 
a Condition one. £ Citations Omitted^/ 211 
P. at 703,. 
Paragraph 6 of the Guaranty Agreement signed by Bailey 
is obviously a Conditional Guaranty. It provides that: 
Spanish Trail hereby agrees ... it would 
first pursue and exhaust its remedy for repayment 
of any funds due it... by taking the Coca-Cola... 
and selling same. ... Secondly Carrier pledges 
as collateral its equity in its real estate ... 
to Spanish Trail, and if necessary same will be 
applied towards fulfilling this agreement after 
Spanish Trail has exhausted its remedy ... in 
selling the Coca-Cola. Having exhausted the afore-
mentioned remedies and if any delinquency still 
exists ... then Spanish Trail can pursue said 
delinquency against the undersigned Guarantor... 
Spanish Trail must proceed against the Coca-Cola and the real estate 
before pursuing Bailey. These are conditions precedent to any 
action against Bailey. The substitution of collateral, without 
the consent or the knowledge of Bailey acts to release Bailey of 
any liability under the Guaranty as the conditions of paragraph 6 
could no longer be met. 
This Court has recognized that if the Guaranty requires the 
creditor to first proceed against collateral, no action may be 
maintained against the Guarantor until the condition is met. The 
Court in Strevell-Patterson Co., Inc. vs. Francis 646 P.2d 741, 
743 (Utah 1982) stated: 
...Whether a creditor has a duty to pursue 
the debtor or the security as a precondition to 
action against the Guarantor "depends 'upon the nature 
of the Guarantor's promise."... In coritrast, a 
Guaranty of collection is conditional only, tne 
Guarantor's liability being dependant upon the 
creditors first exhausting its remedies against 
the debtor and any security before resorting to 
action against the Guarantor. (Emphasip in original, 
citation omitt^H\ 
The Court, based upon the particular language of the Guaranty, 
found the Guarantors liable on an absolute Guaranty. However, 
in this case, the particular language of the Guaranty creates 
conditions that must first be met. Because Spanish Trail did not 
meet those conditions, Bailey is released from the Guaranty. In 
Behlen Manufacturing Co. vs. First National Bank of Englewood 28 
Colo. App. 300, 472 P.2d 703 (1970) the Guarantor was released 
because the creditor failed to take measures to perfect its 
security interest in the debtorfs collateral. The creditor 
argued, as does Spanish Trail, that any such duty was waived by 
the language of the Guaranty Agreement. The Court, however, stated: 
If the destruction or impairment of such 
a right (of subrogation) is to be waived by a 
Guarantor, it should only be by the most unequivocal 
language in the Guaranty Agreement. The language 
relied upon by the banks does not meet this test. 
The only waiver in the Guaranty Agreement has to 
do with notice of nonpayment, protest, extension of 
the note and partial payment. There is no waiver 
relating to the collateral. 472 P.2d at 707 through 
708. 
The only waiver in the present case, agreed to by the Guarantor, 
is as to "presentment, demand, protest, notice of dishonor and 
extension of time without notice.1' Clearly, Spanish Trail's failure 
to adhere to paragraph 6 of the Guaranty Agreement releases the 
Guarantor Bailey, from liability. 
Spanish Trail claims that it attempted to foreclose on the 
real property, also taken as collateral, but was stopped from doing 
so by Carrier. Spanish Trail fails to mention that two trustees 
sales were scheduled. The first was cancelled by Spanish Trail 
and on the second, Spanish Trail failed to enter any type of 
bid /""Deposition of Stoof at page 12 J . In addition, it made no 
attempt to proceed against the Coca-Cola, or even the ice cream 
and fish. Its failure to comply with the conditions of the Guaranty 
acts as a release of Bailey, the Guarantor. In Olson vs. U.S. 
National BanK of Oregon, 70 Or. App. 460, 689 P.2d 1021 (1984), 
the Court, construing a letter of credit, eventually the same 
as the Guaranty, stated: "The Plaintiff may not recover unless 
it complies strictly with the letter of credit" 689 P.2d at 1022. 
The surety in that matter was released becjause the creditor did 
not comply with the terms of the Agreeemen|t. The Utah Supreme 
Court m Powerine Co. vs. Russell, Inc. 10 
906, 911 (1943), recognized the letter of 
as the same thing. The Court also held th^t "...the Guarantor 
is entitled to have his undertaking as thu^ determined strictly 
construed." 
Spanish Trail's failure to comply wi 
paragraph 6 of the Agreement releases the guarantor, Bailey, from 
the Guaranty, 
II. 
A MODIFICATION OF THE CONTRACT WITHdUT THE APPROVAL 
3 Utah 441, 135 P.2d 
credit and the Guaranty 
h the requirements of 
OF THE GUARANTOR, BAILEY, OPERATES T< 0 RELEASE HIM 
FROM LIABILITY UNDER THE GUARANTY 
The original Agreement contracted for an interest rate of 
twenty-five percent (25%) per annum on unpaid balances. This 
Agreement was signed on the 20th day of July, 1981. Just one 
month later, on the 19th day of August, 1981, this provision was 
modified by Stoof and Spanish Trail to calculate interest at the 
rate of five percent (5%) per month. This amounts to an un-
consciounable interest rate of sixty percent (60%) per annum. 
This modification was done without the knowledge of Bailey. 
As this was a substantial change in the ternjs of the Agreement, 
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this also acts to release Bailey from the Guaranty, The Court 
in George E. Failing Co, vs. Cardwell Investment Co., 190 
Kan. 509, 376 P.2d 892 (1962) in releasing a Guarantor stated: 
Even compensated Guarantors are not liable 
when the original contract on which they are 
undertaking was made is materially changed 
without their assent. The gratuitous or 
accommodation Guarantor is discharged by any 
change, material or not .... He has a right 
to stand upon the very terms of his obliga-
tion and is bound no further. 376 P.2d at 898. 
It is well established that the change in the terms of 
the Guarantor's Agreement relieves him of his liability. See 
McBride Electric, Inc. vs. Putts Tuff, Inc. 9 Kan. App. 2d 
548, 685 P.2d 316 (1984); Olson vs. U.S. National Bank of Oregon 
70 Or. App. 460, 689 P.2d 1021 (1984); Farber vs. Green Shoe 
Manufacturing Co. 677 P.2d 376 (Colo.App. 1983); Gandy vs. Park 
National Bank 615 P.2d 20 (Colo. 1980); Kutilek vs. Union National 
Bank of Wichita 213 Kan. 407, 516 P.2d 979 (1973); Jackson vs. 
First National Bank of Greely 28 Colo. App. 415, 474 P.2d 640 
(1970). 
III. 
THE GUARANTOR, BAILEY, HAVING NO KNOWLEDGE OF THE 
MODIFICATION OF THE AGREEMENT OR THE SUBSTITUTION 
OF COLLATERAL IS NOT ESTOPPED FROM CLAIMING A RELEASE. 
Estoppel takes place when one person, through his repre-
sentations or conduct, induces another person to do an act. The 
actor is estopped or prevented from disclaiming his representa-
tions or acts. In this case, the Guarantor, Bailey, had no 
knowledge that the collateral was substituted. He had no knowledge 
that the interest rate had been renegotiated. He therefore 
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could not have done anything to induce Spanish Trail to act. He can-
not be estopped when he has done nothing and had no knowledge of the 
events. This is especially true since Spanish Trail negotiated 
these changes with Stoof1 /""stoof Deposition page 7/- it is 
further clear from the document itself that the interest changes 
were approved by Spanish Trail. As Spanish Trail points out, this 
Court has stated m G. Eugene England Foundation vs. Smiths Food 
King No. 6 542 P.2d 753 (Utah 1975) that when one of two innocent 
parties must suffer a loss, it should be the one who made the 
choices leading to the loss. Certainly Bajiley made no choices as 
he had no knowledge of the same. Indeed, 
the Defendant, Smiths, was found to be notl 
strictly honored its contractual obligations. Here, Bailey has 
honored his contractual obligation but Spanish Trail has not 
honored its obligations. 
Under similar facts in Iola State BaAk vs. 8iggs ^J3 Kan. 
|in G. Eugene England, 
liable because it had 
450, 662 P.2d 563 (1983) the Court released the Guarantor from 
liability and further held that estoppel cduld not be claimed 
by the creditor due to the Guarantor's failure to request a release 
of the earlier guarantees. A failure to act, absent a duty to 
do so, was no an estoppel in that case, andj cannot be one in 
the present case. 
sh Trail's counsel ^The questioning of Mr. Stoof by SpaniL. _
went as follows: Q. Were you aware of negotiations after this 
agreement came in default? A. Yes. Q. Between Carrier Brokers 
and Spanish Trail? A. Yes. Q. Do part of those agreements 
include some type of a fish transaction? Ai. Yes. 
The fact that Bailey was President of Carrier Brokers 
is of no avail. The Guaranty is not a corporate Guaranty but 
is an individual Guaranty. If the individual does not know of 
the change, he cannot be estopped from asserting a release of 
the Guaranty based on those changes. 
IV. 
SUBSTITUTION OF COLLATERAL WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF 
THE GUARANTOR, BAILEY, OPERATES TO RELEASE HIM FROM 
LIABILITY UNDER THE GUARANTY 
The Agreement and Guaranty in the present action clearly 
contemplates a one time transaction involving Coca-Coia. Spanisn 
Trail was to loan money for the specific purchase of Coca-Cola. 
The Coca-Cola was to be sold for a profit and the money paid back 
within forty (40) days. The Coca-Cola was placed as security and 
Spanish Trail was obligated to pursue the Coca-Cola prior to 
proceeding against the Guarantor. Such an Agreement is a conditional 
or restricted Guaranty, as distinguished from a continuing Guaranty, 
where the parties contemplate a series of transactions or a 
revolving line of credit. Any deviation from the strict terms 
of the Guaranty will act to release the Guarantor. In Ioia State 
Bank vs. Biggs,supra, 233 Kan. 450, 662 P.2d 563 (1983) two 
Guarantees were given guaranteeing the debts of a business. The 
buseinss was later incorporated and a third Guaranty issued. 
The preincorporation loans were consolidated into one loan belonging 
to the corporation. When the corporation defaulted, the creditor 
sought to enforce all three guarantys. The Court held that 
consolidating the loans released the Guarnators on the first two 
Guarantys. The Court stated at 570: 
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A Guarantor may be relieved of an obli-
gation to pay if the debt is extinguished, 
if there is a valid release 
if the claim against the Guarantor is barred 
by the Statute of Limitations, or if there 
is a change in the original 





In the present case, the substitution of fish and ice cream 1 
(Emphasis added). 
a change therein and 
ar facts are found in 
beyond the scope of the agreement, it is 
releases Bailey from the Guarantor. SimiJ 
Webb vs. B^ inger Contract Supply Co. 447 S.W. 2d 906 (Tex. 1969) 
where the Guarantor was deemed discharged because of substitution 
of collateral. There the creditor was secured with the furniture 
of the principal debtor, a motel. The creditor subordinated its 
position in the furniture without the knowledge of the Guarantor. 
The Court ruled this acted as a release even though the Guaranty 
did not require the debtor to first pursue) 
Court stated: 
the collateral. The 
It has been said that "the power to 
modify anything does not imply the power 
to substitute a thing entirely different, 
and it does not confer the power to destroy" 
/ Citations Omitted/ 447 S.W.2d at 908. 
In the instant case, the agreement was a one time transaction 
for the purchase of Coca-Cola. Coca-Cola is a well known product 
with a ready resell value. As paragraph 6 of the agreement obligat 
Spanish Trail to proceed first against the collateral before 
proceeding against the Guarantors, the sunscitunion of the Coca-
Cola for ice cream and fish is a substantial change which acts 
to release the Guarantor, Bailey. This is especially true as 
Stoof offered to return the balance of the loan proceeds when 
no more Coca-Cola was available,but Spanish Trail negotiated 
the substitution of collateral with Stoof /[Stoof Deposition 
page 7, 14 __/, but without the knowledge of Bailey. 
Spanish Trail argues that the agreement contemplated a 
substitution of collateral and should therefore be enforced. 
Spanish Trail cites to paragraph 4 of the agreement for this 
proposition. Under paragraph 4,Bailey, the Guarantor, has 
clearly waived his rights to "presentment, demand, protest, 
notice of dishonor and extension of time without notice'1 where 
the document reads "Carrier and/or Guarantor hereby waives its 
right" to those protections. However, Bailey did not waive his 
rights or consent that Spanish Trail may release or substitute 
security. Paragraph 4 continues by saying: "...Carrier 
further consents to release of any security or collateral 
hereunder, or any part thereof, with or without substutition." 
(Emphasis Added). If this were to include Bailey, the provision 
would have read "Carrier and/or Guarantor", as the earlier pro-
vision nad done. Spanish Trail could have inserted that language 
in the contract and could have insisted that it remain and cannot 
now complain that it erred when the agreement was signed. 
Spanish Trail erroneously relies on this Court's recent 
decision m Continental Bank & Trust Co. vs. Utah Security Mortgage 
Inc. 11 U.A.R. 38 (Utah 1985). That case dealt with the issues 
of whether the creditor had to preserve and/or proceed against 
collateral before proceeding against the Guarantors. Furthermore, 
the Guarantors had expressly agreed that the creditor need not 
protect or proceed first against the collateral. Such is not the 
agreement in the present case. 
Because of substitution of collateral is a substantial change 
in the terms of the agreement, done without the knowledge of the 
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Guarantor Bailey, Bailey has been released from the Guaranty and 
his liability thereunder as a matter of l|aw. 
V. 
CONCLUSION 
Paragraph 6 of the Guaranty Agreement obligates Spanish 
Trail to proceed against collateral prior to proceeding against 
the Guarantor. The Guarantor is entitled to have the Guaranty 
strictly construed. Since Spanish Trail flailed to meet the conditions 
of the Guaranty, the Guarantor has been released. 
Spanish Trail, without the knowledge of Bailey, the Guarantor, 
modified the agreement to increase the interest rate from twenty-
five percent (25%) per annum to sixty percent (60%) per annum. 
Such a change is a substantial modification and acts to release 
the Guarantor who has not consented to the alterations. 
There can be no estoppel since Bailey had no knowledge and 
performed no acts inducing Spanish Trail to substitute collateral 
and modify the interest rate. Furthermore, 
caused its own predicament by consenting tq 
with Stoof. 
The substitution of collateral, withok 
also acts as a release. This one time transaction contemplated that 
a readily marketable commodity would be purchased. That 
commodity had to be foreclosed prior to proceeding against the 
Guarantor. The substitution of that collateral for less marketable 
commodities acts to release the Guarantor. 
Spanish Trail has 
the modifications 
it Bai ley ' s knowledge, 
- 1 4 -
The act of Spanish Trail had the legal effect of releasing 
the individual liability of Bailey, who conditionally guaranteed 
the performance of the agreement. The lower Court, after hearing 
the evidence, correctly ruled that Bailey was released and that 
decision should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS <^Sf? day of September, 
1985. 
'ID E. HALLIDAY 
Attorney for Third-Part^ 
Defendant and Respondent 
SNOW & HALLIDAY 
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